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Raising the topic of bankruptcy in the midst of a symposium on
any nonbankruptcy topic tends to put a damper on things. It is a little
bit like trying to sell life insurance at a wedding: Why spoil the fun of
discussing intellectual property law, family law, environmental law, or
you-name-it by raising the specter of a distressed debtor's resort to
that murky realm of the federal courts? Fortunately, the organizers of
this Symposium wisely chose to include among the topics for discus-
sion the consideration of bankruptcy as a tool for resolving mass torts.
Perhaps its inclusion comes more naturally to this Symposium than to
others, since a discussion of mass torts necessarily devotes itself to a
crisis situation. Moreover, given the increasing number of companies
that have pursued a bankruptcy reorganization solution to their mass
tort problems,1 a symposium focusing on the current realities pre-
sented by mass tort litigation and seeking better means of resolving
such cases could not reasonably omit consideration of the topic.
2
Professor Resnick makes a good case for accepting bankruptcy as
t Burton Craige Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I
gratefully acknowledge the invaluable research and collaborative assistance provided
by Matthew C. Stiegler.
See, e.g., Lindsey v. O'Brien, Tanski, Tanzer & Young Health Care Providers of
Conn. (In reDow Coming Corp.), 86 F.3d 482, 485 (6th Cir. 1996);In re UNR Indus.,
Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 767-68 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1035 (3d
Cir. 1985); In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 203 B.R. 256 (S.D. Ohio 1996); In re A.H.
Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 743-45 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd 880 F.2d 694, 696-97 (4th Cir.
1989); In reJohns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
2 Cf ADvIsORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES AND WORKING GROUP ON MASS TORTS,
REPORT ON MASS TORT LI1GATION 58-60 (Feb. 15, 1999) [hereinafter REPORT ON
MASS TORT LITIGATION] (discussing possible bankruptcy solutions to mass tort prob-
lem).
3 Unless otherwise indicated, I use the term "bankruptcy" throughout this corn-
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an appropriate vehicle for resolving what he calls "enterprise-
threatening" mass tort liability.4 Among other things, he points out
the procedural and jurisdictional advantages of bankruptcy that per-
mit the consolidation and binding resolution of all pending and fu-
ture tort claims against the debtor. He then advocates statutory
changes to clarify existing uncertainties concerning bankruptcy's
treatment of mass tort claims and to bolster bankruptcy courts'
authority to achieve a "lasting and global peace" of a corporate
debtor's mass tort liability.5 I am in basic agreement with these two
main points of Professor Resnick's article. I agree that bankruptcy is
an appropriate tool for resolving mass tort claims asserted against cer-
tain defendants and that improvements should be sought to make
bankruptcy a more effective mass tort resolution method. I fear, how-
ever, that Professor Resnick has overstated the case for bankruptcy in
certain respects, and so I address constitutional concerns raised in
certain mass tort contexts which a bankruptcy resolution may not be
able to ignore.
Even those who have not heretofore embraced the idea that bank-
ruptcy is an appropriate vehicle for resolving mass torts may now be
forced to consider such a possibility, given the obstacles that the Su-
preme Court has recently placed in the way of two other collective
resolution devices. The Court's first product liability mass tort deci-
sion, Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,6 rejected a Rule 23(b) (3) class
certification that was sought to achieve a global settlement affecting
"hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of individuals" either cur-
rently or possibly in the future possessing asbestos-related claims
against one or more of twenty companies. In so ruling, the Court
identified certification problems in that case that may exist for many
attempted mass tort settlementss and for which the necessary solutions
mentary to refer to bankruptcy reorganizations under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1146 (1994).
4 Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a VehiceforResolvngEnterpise-Threatening Mass Tort
Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045 (2000).
Id. at 2067.
521 U.S. 591 (1997).
7 Id. at 597.
8 See id. at 624 (holding that Rule 23(b) (3)'s requirement that "[common] ques-
tions of law or fact predominate" was not satisfied due to the overarching significance
of questions "peculiar to the several categories of class members, and to individuals
within each category"); id. at 626-27 (holding that Rule 23(a) (4)'s adequacy of repre-
sentation requirement was not met due to lack of alignment of class members' inter-
ests and absence of "structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the
diverse groups and individuals affected"); id. at 628 (questioning whether constitu-
tionally adequate notice "could ever be given to legions so unselfconscious and amor-
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are likely to make Rule 23 (b) (3) settlements less attractive as a mass
tort remedy.9 More recently, in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,10 the Court re-
versed the certification of a Rule 23(b) (1) (B) class action settlement
based on the class's failure to satisfy requirements that the Court de-
12rived from a historically based model1 of limited fund class actions.
The Court not only imposed requirements for limited fund class ac-
tions that may be difficult to meet,13 but also pointedly questioned on
several occasions, without resolving, whether a mandatory Rule
23(b) (1) (B) class action may ever be appropriately certified in the
case of a mass tort.1 4 While Amchem and Ortiz may not sound the death
phous" as the class members who had not manifested any asbestos-related injuries and
their future spouses and children).
9 See REPORT ON MASS TORT ITIGATION, supra note 2, at 41 ("[C]ertifying and set-
tling a large class action under Rule 23(b) (3) for global peace may be more difficult
after Amchem and may be unachievable for future claimants.");John C. Coffee, Jr., Con-
flicts, Consent, and Allocation AfterAmchem Products-Or, Why Attorneys Still Need Consent
to Give Away Their Clients' Money, 84 VA. L. REV. 1541, 1552-53 (1998) (discussing one
possible reading of Amchem as requiring the "balkaniz[ation of] the class into an un-
manageable assortment of small subclasses that cannot easily act in concert"); Eric D.
Green, What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? We'll Settle in Bunches: Bringing Rule 23
into the Twenty-First Century, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1773, 1778 (1997) ("[I]t is apparent that
few, if any, mass tort classes (especially those involving exposure-only victims), could
meet the [Amchem] majority's interpretation of Rule 23(b) (3)'s predominance test or
Rule 23(a) (4)'s adequacy of representation test, for either class action settlement or
trial.").
10 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
n See id. at 2309-12 (identifying the characteristics of traditional limited fund suits);
id. at 2313 (noting that "the greater the leniency in departing from the historical lim-
ited fund model, the greater the likelihood of abuse" and "[t]he prudent course,
therefore, is to presume that... the object [of Rule 23(b) (1) (B)] was to stay close to
the historical model").
12 The Court held that a limited fund mass tort settlement class must satisfy the fol-
lowing requirements to be certified, and that the class before it had failed to do so:
[I] t would be essential that the fund be shown to be limited independently of
the agreement of the parties to the action, and equally essential under Rule
23(a) and (b) (1) (B) that the class include all those with claims unsatisfied at
the time of the settlement negotiations, with intraclass conflicts addressed by
recognizing independently represented subclasses.
Id. at 2323.
15 See Matthew C. Stiegler, Note, Ortiz and the Future of Limited Fund Settlement Class
Actions in Mass Tort Litigation, 78 N.C. L. Rav. 856, 900 (2000) ("Ortiz has made limited
fund class certification substantially, perhaps prohibitively, more difficult and uncer-
tain.").
14 See Oftiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2312 ("[We cannot... decide the ultimate question
whether settlements of multitudes of related tort actions are amenable to mandatory
class treatment...."); id. at 2314 ("We do not, it is true, decide the ultimate question
whether Rule 23(b) (1) (B) may ever be used to aggregate individual tort claims." (cita-
tion omitted)); id. at 2323 ("In sum, the applicability of Rule 23(b) (1) (B) to a fund
and plan purporting to liquidate actual and potential tort claims is subject to question
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knell for mass tort class action settlements, 5 the decisions certainly in-
crease the difficulty of getting either type of class action certified by a
district court and ultimately approved on appeal . It is to be ex-
pected, therefore, that parties seeking a global resolution of mass tort
litigation may look elsewhere for a solution.7
Bankruptcy provides such a possible solution-at least until the
Supreme Court decides to take and resolve a mass tort case that raises
the issue whether bankruptcy may be used as a global resolution vehi-
cle."8 Companies overwhelmed by the costs of defending and satisfy-
... ."); id. (emphasizing that in holding the settlement class invalid for failure to com-
port with the attributes of limited fund class actions, the Court "[a]ssum[ed] arguendo
that a mandatory, limited fund rationale could under some circumstances be applied
to a settlement class of tort claimants").
"5 See id. at 2822 ("[We have not ruled out the possibility under the present Rule
of a mandatory class to deal with mass tort litigation on a limited fund rationale .... ");
Coffee, supra note 9, at 1559 ("[T]here is a variety of feasible alternatives by which
Amehemn Products might be implemented.... Amchem Products will in time require fairer
rules, but the inquiry has only begun as how to best implement its holdings and its phi-
losophy.").
16 See, for example, Wish v. Interneuron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (In re Diet Drugs
(Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. MDL 1203,
CIV.A.98-20594, 1999 WL 782560 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 1999), in which the court stated:
While this court does not read Ortiz as a bar to limited fund class certification
in all mass tort cases, Ortiz does counsel against those .class certifications
which would deprive the class of the protections available under the tradi-
tional model. For that reason, the court denies the motion for class certifica-
tion.
Id. at *14. See, e.g., Walker v. Liggett Group, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 226, 233 (S.D.W. Va.
1997) ("Intervenor... has demonstrated adequately why certification, under either
Rules 23(b) (1) (B) or (b) (3) cannot occur on these facts after Amchem. Accordingly,
the Court (1) ... WITHDRAWS its preliminary approval and certification of the set-
tiement and settlement class; and (2) DENIES Plaintiffs' motion for class certification."
(emphasis omitted)).
17 See, e.g., Richard B. Schmitt & Laura Johannes,Judge Rejects Intneuron s Proposed
Class-Action Settlement Over Diet Pill WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1999, at B15 (speculating
about possible bankruptcy filing by diet pill manufacturer after district court rejection
of its proposed limited fund class action settlement).
'8 To date, the Supreme Court has not granted review in a mass tort bankruptcy
case. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Tort Claimants v. Dow Coming Corp., 522 U.S. 977
(1997) (denying certiorari in breast implant bankruptcy); Official Comm. of Tort
Claimants v. Dow Coming Corp., 519 U.S. 1071 (1997) (same); UNARCO Blooming-
ton Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., Inc., 513 U.S. 999 (1994) (denying certiorari in
asbestos bankruptcy); Menard-Sanford v. A.H. Robins Co., 493 U.S. 959 (1989) (deny-
ing certiorari in Dalkon Shield bankruptcy). Furthermore, significant procedural ob-
stacles may stand in the way of Supreme Court review of the confirmation of a mass
tort bankruptcy reorganization plan. By the time a challenge to a plan would be able
to work its way up to the Supreme Court, it is likely that the plan would have been im-
plemented to such a degree that review would be impracticable or futile. See, e.g., In re
UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming district court's dismissal
of appeal because, although the appeal was not legally moot, the plan's trust provisions
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ing the claims of thousands of tort claimants have in the past and will
continue in the future to seek bankruptcy relief.9 Accordingly,
whether or not bankruptcy is the preferred solution, attention needs
to be paid to how it can be made more effective as a resolution vehicle
for mass torts, and one that is constitutionally sound in all respects.
I. ADVANTAGES OF BANKRUPTCYFOR RESOLVING MASS TORTS
Professor Resnick has discussed a number of features of the bank-
ruptcy system that make it an appropriate vehicle for resolving the
mass tort litigation facing a bankruptcy debtor. The chief advantage is
that bankruptcy, because it demands an all-encompassing financial so-
lution, provides the best conceptual fit for the global resolution of en-
terprise-threatening mass tort liability. When a company faces massive
tort liability that threatens the viability of the company, it is not just a
problem for the tort claimants and the company's management. It is
a problem affecting all who have a financial relationship with the
company, including other creditors, shareholders, employees, cus-
tomers, suppliers, officers, and directors. As Professor Resnick cor-
rectly points out, bankruptcy is the only resolution mechanism that
makes the holders of all of those claims and interests come to the ta-
ble and thereby come to grips with the problem facing the company.
By staying other means of collecting debts and receiving property
from the debtor, bankruptcy consolidates all financial claims against
the debtor-not just those based on tort law-and then allows the
various constituencies to participate in attempting to arrive at an equi-
21table solution for all concerned parties.
Bankruptcy's all-inclusive approach stands in contrast to the reso-
lution of mass torts by means of limited fund class action settlements.2
were too far implemented to be disturbed); Rochman v. Northeast Utils. Serv. Group
(In re Public Serv. Co. of N.H.), 963 F.2d 469, 476 (1st Cir. 1992) (dismissing appeal
from plan confirmation on the ground that "the absence of a stay pending the appeal
of the order confirming the reorganization plan permitted its implementation to so
substantial an extent as to leave the court powerless to grant fair and effective relief").
'9 See, e-g., supra note 1 (listing cases of mass tort defendants seeking bankruptcy
relief).
SeeTHOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANiKRupcY LAw 17 (1986)
(explaining that bankruptcy is both collective and compulsory and stating that it "pro-
vides a way to override the creditors' pursuit of their own remedies and to make them
work together"); CHARLESJORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 5 (1997) (describ-
ing bankruptcy as "a compulsory collective remedy"); id. at 8 (noting that a "chapter 11
bankruptcy reorganization contains both a stay provision ... and a rule binding dis-
senters to the terms of the plan agreed to by the bulk of creditors").
21 The contrast with Rule 23(b)(3) class action settlements is even more pro-
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The theory underlying the certification under Rule 23(b) (1) (B) of a
mandatory class of tort claimants is that without such consolidation
those who are among the first to sue and recover will deplete the
company's assets, leaving nothing for those who seek recovery at a
later time.2 Thus, in order to prevent the impairment of the late-
comers' interests, all potential tort claimants are brought together in
one proceeding, and the limited assets that the defendant company
offers are divided equitably among them.2
The problem, however, with this theory is that if the allegedly in-
sufficient fund is the company itself, rather than a finite fund to which
only a discrete group has a claim, 4 then the tort claimants are not the
only ones competing for the scarce resources. All of the unsecured
creditors have a claim to the unencumbered assets-and the share-
holders to any remaining balance-and likewise all should be forced,
in Professor Resnick's words, to "share the pain. " 25 Limited fund class
action settlements of mass torts, however, do not operate in this man-
nounced, since potential members of the class are allowed to opt out in that type of
class action. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2)-(3) (providing that potential members of a
23(b) (3) class may request exclusion and that those who do so will not be bound by
thejudgment). Thus, it is likely that not even all tort claimants will be included within
the class action resolution.
22 See, e.g., Fanning v. Acromed Corp. (In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab.
Litig.), 176 F.R.D. 158, 177 (E.D. Pa. 1997) ("AcroMed's net assets and insurance cov-
erage are vastly insufficient to satisfy the many claims against them. Addition-
ally... [a]fter incurring... defense costs, AcroMed would have had little or no ability
to pay settlements or judgments to plaintiffs in individual cases."); Butler v. Mentor
Corp. (In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. CV 93-P-11433-S, CV
92-P-10000-S, MDL No. 926, 1993 WL 795477, at *5 (N.D. Ala. June 2, 1993) (basing
preliminary certification decision on the "risk that defense costs, individual settle-
ments, or a few judgments would exhaust the Mentor Defendants' assets before other
claimants, with similar claims, had an opportunity to be heard").
" See Orthopedic Bone Screw, 176 F.RD. at 177 ("This settlement shuts offAcroMed's
defense cost flow and places all claimants on the same plane, at the same time, with
respect to AcroMed's financial capacity to respond to all of the claims, leaving each
claimant[']s share to be determined by traditional application of equitable distribution
standards."); Silicone Gel Breast Implant, 1993 WL 795477, at *5 ("[T]he capture of these
assets in the proposed settlement for equitable distribution to all class members ap-
pears to be a fairer and superior alternative to the potential exhaustion of these assets
in continued litigation ... ."). But see Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S.
Ct. 2295, 2313 (1999) ("[I]t is clear that the Advisory Committee did not contemplate
that the mandatory class action codified in subdivision (b) (1) (B) would be used to ag-
gregate unliquidated tort claims on a limited fund rationale.").
21 See OrtiZ, 119 S. C. at 2309 (noting that among "classic" limited fund class ac-
tions are suits by claimants to trust assets, bank accounts, and insurance proceeds).
See Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80
CORNELL L. REv. 858, 880 (1995) ("[T]he limited fund theory would call for the inclu-
sion of al claimants, whatever the source of their claims.").
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ner. Only the tort claims are compromised; the claims of other unse-
cured creditors and the interests of shareholders remain unaffected.
26
There may well be situations where it is fair to place the burden of
compromise only on the tort claimants when a limited fund class ac-
tion settlement is approved. If the defendant's tort liability is as yet
scientifically unproven and still vigorously disputed, it may in fact be
the case. that the tort claimants are receiving more under the settle-
ment than they would turn out to be entitled to receive if the claims
were litigated, even if they are receiving only a percentage of the
amount they initially claimed. Thus, it can be argued that the tort
claimants are not being treated inequitably in relation to the com-
mercial creditors. Even when liability is well established, ajustification
for paying commercial creditors in full while the tort claimants are re-
quired to share a limited fund may be that full payment of such credi-
tors is necessary for the continued operation of the business, which in
turn provides the basis for funding future pay-outs to the tort claim-
ants.28
The advantage bankruptcy has to offer, even when full payment of
commercial claims may be in everyone's interest, is that all affected
groups have an opportunity to negotiate and vote on the appropriate
treatment of tort claimants, trade creditors, bond holders, sharehold-
ers, and the like.2 Thus the fairness of full payment of commercial
SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1458-59 (1995) (criticizing limited fund class action settlements,
pursuant to which "stock values soar, while tort creditors are either scaled back or
forced to rely on thinly funded or unspecified settlement funds"); Marcus, supra note
25, at 880 (emphasizing that limited fund class actions do not adjust the claims of all
creditors to the defendant's limited assets).
See Marcus, supra note 25, at 879 ("Plaintiff lawyers are notoriously and under-
standably generous in their prayers for relief, and these should not be taken as reliable
indicators of probable recovery.").
2 This was the rationale of the district court in Orthopedic Bone Screw, 176 F.RD. at
177. In approving a Rule 23(b) (1) (B) class settlement, the court explained that the
settlementwas to be funded by "an outside infusion of $100 million of borrowed funds
not otherwise available except for the terms of the settlement." Id The court further
noted that "[w]ithout this infusion, the settlement cannot be accomplished and with-
out the settlement, AcroMed will consume itself by exhausting all of its resources in-
cluding its traditional borrowing potential." Id. Continued operation of the company
was therefore necessary to repay the loan taken out to fund the settlement to the tort
claimants.
2S See 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (3) (1994) (authorizing creditors' committees to "partici-
pate in the formulation of a plan [and] advise those represented by such committee of
such committee's determinations as to any plan formulated"); id. § 1126(a) ("The
holder of a claim or interest allowed under section 502 of this title may accept or reject
a plan.").
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creditors is not just assumed or accepted unquestioningly, as it is in
the case of limited fund class action settlements. If such treatment is
provided for by a bankruptcy reorganization plan, it must either be
accepted by all classes of creditors and equity security holders, or sub-
stantive protections for non-accepting classes must be satisfied.8 0
Professor Resnick also points out the procedural advantages that
bankruptcy offers for aggregating mass tort claims against the bank-
ruptcy debtor in a single forum and then for arriving at a global and
binding resolution of them. Among the features of bankruptcy that
he discusses are the automatic stay, the grant of exclusive jurisdiction
over the debtor's property, nationwide service of process, and the
bankruptcy court's authority to determine where personal injury and
wrongful death tort litigation will take place.3' These features of
bankruptcy are essential components of a system designed to achieve
a collective resolution of an ailing debtor's financial liabilities; one
court is able to bring a halt to individual collection efforts and to over-
see the orderly liquidation or reorganization of the debtor for the
32benefit of all creditors. These same procedures and grants of
authority thus lend themselves naturally to the resolution of a large
group of tort claims asserted against a company.3 Indeed, the value
of these procedural tools for the resolution of mass torts is borne out
"' See Keene Corp. v. Fiorelli (In reJoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 14 F.3d 726,
732 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[C]lass members in [class action] cases such as this would have no
say in the conduct of the court-appointed class representatives and, unlike creditors in
bankruptcy, are not able to vote on a settlement. For them, it would be 'cram-down'
from start to finish." (citation omitted)).
3' See Resnick, supra note 4, Part I.B (discussing the advantages of nationwide juris-
diction, automatic stay, and other procedures when dealing with mass torts).
32 As one commentator has stated:
This collective approach, when applied to the bankruptcy system, creates a
structure that precludes the creditors from individually chasing the debtor's
treasure (the available assets). Instead, the creditors work together to both
preserve and enhance the treasure and cut back on the costs of trying to re-
cover a piece of it. The loss from the disaster (debtor nonpayment) is then
shared among the creditors.
KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 137
(1997). See 3 COLIER ON BANKRUPTcY 362.03[2] (15th ed. 1999) ("Without the stay,
the debtor's assets might well be dismembered, and its business destroyed, before the
debtor has an opportunity to put forward a plan for future operations.... The stay
prevents this piecemeal liquidation, offering the chance to maximize the value of the
business.").
"See United States Lines, Inc. v. American S.S. Owners Mutual Protection & In-
dem. Ass'n (In reUnited States Lines, Inc.), 197 F.3d 631, 641 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[A]s we
have previously pointed out, the bankruptcy court is the preferable venue in which to
handle mass tort actions involving claims against an insolvent debtor." (citingJoint E.
& S. Dist. Asbestos, 14 F.3d at 732)).
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by the extent to which the attempt has been made to incorporate simi-
lar procedures into mass tort class actions, effectively turning them
into "designer bankruptcies."4
If bankruptcy provides such an appropriate theoretical and pro-
cedural framework for addressing the situation facing a company
whose viability is threatened by mass tort litigation, one might wonder
why it has not become the mass tort solution of choice for such com-
panies. Several practical obstacles stand in the way of bankruptcy's
becoming the darling of the mass tort world. Generally, lawyers other
than the ones who are engaged in litigating mass torts handle bank-
ruptcies, 5 and, as a general rule, judges other than those who handle
mass tort litigation preside over bankruptcy cases.-6 While these rules
are not invariably true, 7 they are true frequently enough to create a
cultural divide that tort lawyers must traverse if a bankruptcy solution
is soughts Perhaps an even greater deterrent to seeking a bankruptcy
solution is the risk of displacement faced by those in a company who
would be the ones generally to make the decision to file for bank-
ruptcy. In cases in which the value of the mass tort claims truly ap-
pears to exceed the value of the company, existing management is
faced with the very real possibility not only that they will lose their
34
Indeed, the [class action] process contemplated by Keene mirrors a bank-
ruptcy proceeding. The finding of a limited fund corresponds to a finding of
insolvency. The preliminary injunction serves much the same function as the
automatic stay under Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The class rep-
resentatives correspond to creditors' committees in Chapter 11 proceedings.
The proposed mandatory class settlement mirrors a reorganization plan and
'cram-down,' followed by a discharge.
Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos, 14 F.3d at 732 (citations omitted); see also Henry Paul Mona-
ghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98
CoLUM. L. REv. 1148, 1164 (1998) (describing Rule 23 (b) (1) (B) mass tort class ac-
tions as the "functional equivalent to bankruptcy").
See, e.g., REPORT ON MAss TORT LITGATION, supra note 2, app. E at 34 (noting
hiring of bankruptcy specialist as counsel to claimants' committee); RICHARD B.
SOBOL, BENDINGTHE LAW 69,74 (1991) (same).
3' See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1994) (authorizing district courts to refer all bankruptcy
cases to bankruptcy courts).
3' See, eg., id. § 157(d) (authorizing district court "for cause shown" to withdraw a
case referred to bankruptcy court); Ackles v. A.H. Robins Co. (In re A.H. Robins Co.)
59 B.R. 99, 105-07 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Beard v. A.H. Robins Co., 828 F.2d
1029, 1031 (4th Cir. 1987) (withdrawing reference to bankruptcy court of most matters
in Dalkon Shield bankruptcy).
See, e.g., SOBOL, supra note 35, at 73 (observing that plaintiffs' attorneys in the
Dalkon Shield litigation were suspicious and felt outside their "natural habitat" when
the manufacturer filed for bankruptcy).
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jobs, 9 but also that the tort claimants will emerge from bankruptcy as
the owners of the reorganized company. Taking a step that may cause
the company to be turned over to its litigation adversaries is likely to
be considered only as a last resort.40 Finally, even from the viewpoint
of disinterested policymakers, bankruptcy has the disadvantage of tak-
ing a long time to arrive at a resolution, frequently four or more years
to reorganize a company facing mass tort liability.41 The long pen-
dency of the bankruptcy case in turn results in an even longer delay in
making payments to tort victimse and an ever escalating cost of
achieving a resolution.
Some of these obstacles are the inevitable result of enterprise-
threatening liability, but others are capable of being addressed
through procedural reforms.4 In either event, the harsh reality is that
9 See GROSS, supra note 32, at 32 ("[M]anagers of large financially troubled com-
panies are frequently replaced just before or during a large [bankruptcy] case."); Lynn
M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization
of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 723 (1993) (finding that pub-
licly held corporations undergoing Chapter 11 reorganizations experience a high rate
of CEO turnover).
' Cf REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 2, app. E at 16 (noting
debtor's determination to retain control of the reorganized corporation); SOBOL, su-
pra note 35, at 201-04 (noting Company's endorsement of the reorganization plan that
would enable management to retain control).
41 See REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 2, app. C at 84-85 & nn.453-54
(noting that long delays have been "a major criticism" of bankruptcy as a mass tort
resolution tool).
4 See, e.g., Georgene M. Vairo, Georgine, the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, and the
Rhetoric of Mass Tort Claims Resolution, 31 LOy. L.A. L. REv. 79, 155 (1997) (noting that
it took approximately nine years after the Robins plan was consummated and the trust
received full funding for all Dalkon Shield claims to be resolved).
4 Professor Resnick has identified a number of statutory gaps in the Bankruptcy
Code that need to be addressed if bankruptcy is to operate more effectively and on a
firmer legal footing as a mass tort resolution device. I agree with many of the pro-
posed solutions. For example, because bankruptcy has been, and will be, pursued by
mass tort defendants that have sold products other than asbestos, see, e.g., Lindsey v.
O'Brien, Tanski, Tanzer & Young Health Care Providers of Conn. (In re Dow Coming
Corp.) 86 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 1996) (breast implants); In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R.
742 (E.D. Va. 1988), aftd, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989) (birth control devices), the
Bankruptcy Code needs to be amended to eliminate asbestos-specific mass tort author-
ity and instead to provide generally for the resolution of mass torts, whatever the
source of the claims may be. Likewise, the status in bankruptcy of future claimants
needs to be statutorily clarified, although as I discuss below, due process considera-
tions may limit how broadly the class of future claimants should be defined, see infra
note 97 and accompanying text. Finally, I agree with Professor Resnick's suggestions
for substantive amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that would allow the subordina-
tion of punitive damages in mass tort bankruptcy reorganizations, the pre-
confirmation payment of mass tort claimants' emergency medical expenses, and the
protection of asset purchasers from successor liability.
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other options for collective resolution of mass tort claims may be dis-
appearing, so bankruptcy, warts and all, may be a necessary choice for
some defendants. Attention needs to be given, therefore, to possible
constitutional objections to using bankruptcy to resolve all present
and future tort claims.
II. CONCERNS ABOUT BANKRUPTCYAS A MASS TORT VEHICLE
Professor Resnick cites, as one of bankruptcy's advantages, its
standard for classifying claims together that "is far less restrictive than
the four threshold requirements applicable to class actions under
Rule 23."44 As he points out, the Bankruptcy Code's only requirement
for grouping claims together in one class is that they be "substantially
similar,"" a requirement that courts have generally interpreted as
meaning that the claims have the same distribution rank against the
same property of the debtor.46 In that sense, all nonpriority, unsubor-
dinated, unsecured claims are substantially similar and are permitted
to be grouped together in a single class in a reorganization plan. 7
Because of this flexibility in classifying unsecured claims, reor-
Resnick, supra note 4, at 2060.
11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1994) (providing that "a plan may place a claim or interest
in a particular class only if such claim or interest is substantially similar to the other
claims or interests of such class").
4 See, e.g., In reAOV Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("[T]he fo-
cus of the classification is the legal character of the claim as it relates to the assets of the
debtor"); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 32, 1 1122.03[3] ("[T]he term 'sub-
stantially similar' must be construed to mean similar in legal character or effect as a
claim against the debtor's assets or as an interest in the debtor."); id. [ 1122.03[4]
("Claims of the same kind and the same rank involving the same property may be in-
cluded within a single class.");John C. Anderson, Classification of Claims and Interests in
Reorganization Cases Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 101 (1984)
("As a general rule, all creditors with equal rank and with claims against the same
property are usually placed in the same class .... "). But see Teamsters Nat'l Freight
Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. U.S. Truck Co. (In re U.S. Truck Co.) 800 F.2d 581, 584-
87 (6th Cir. 1986) (affirming district court's conclusion that, because of the union's
unique noncreditor interests, its unsecured claim was not substantially similar to other
unsecured claims).
47 See In re Eisenbarth, 77 B.R. 228, 236 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987) ("An unsecured
claim is simply that, an unsecured claim. No valid reason exists for treating the unse-
cured claims of [certain institutional creditors] different than the unsecured claims of
the trade creditors."); Anderson, supra note 46, at 119 (stating that generally "the un-
secured creditors will be placed in the same class and receive the same treatment");
Peter E. Meltzer, Disenfranchising the Dissenting Creditor Through Artificial Classfication or
Arificial Impaiment 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 281, 290 (1992) ("'Unsecured claims will, gen-
erally speaking, comprise one class, whether trade, tort, publicly held debt or a defi-
ciency of a secured creditor.'" (quoting 3 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., BANKRuPTcYLAW
& PRACTIcE § 60.05, at 7 (1991))).
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ganization plans in mass tort bankruptcies frequently place all of the
tort claims together in a single class, regardless of the nature of the
injury, the existence of issues unique to certain claimants, the varying
degrees of legal strength of the claims, or the extent to which injury
has been manifested.48 If such a classification scheme satisfies not only
statutory requirements but also passes constitutional muster, then Pro-
fessor Resnick may be correct in suggesting that bankruptcy offers an
advantage in its ability to consolidate claims. The concerns raised af-
ter Amchem and Ortiz about the possible need for an unwieldy number
of class action subclasses of mass tort claimants could be alleviated by
utilizing bankruptcy's one-class grouping.50
Before accepting the argument that bankruptcy offers an advan-
tage in this regard, however, one must determine why bankruptcy is
permitted greater flexibility in classification than class actions possess.
Perhaps the answer is simply that Rule 23 imposes certain express re-
quirements for class certification that the Bankruptcy Code just does
not impose on Chapter 11 plan classification. For all class actions,
"the claims ... of the representative parties [must be] typical of the
claims.., of the class""' and "the representative parties [must] fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class." 2 For 23(b) (3) class
actions, specifically, "the questions of law or fact common to the
48 See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d at 697 (referring to the class of Dalkon
Shield claimants as one "with so many various unliquidated personal injury claims
which vary so much in the extent and nature of injury, medical evidence and causation
factors" as to render it nearly impossible to provide specific estimates of recovery);
UNARCO Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., Inc., 124 B.R. 268, 271 (N.D.
Ill. 1990) (describing class of asbestos claimants in UNR reorganization plan as includ-
ing "asbestos victims who know they have claims against UNR.... [and] those who
may have been exposed to UNR's asbestos products before the bankruptcy, before
confirmation, or after confirmation, but do not yet have an injury or know they have
an injury"); REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 2, app. E at 34 (describing
class 17 of Eagle-Picher reorganization plan as consisting of "all present and future
rights to payment for death, bodily injury, or other personal damages resulting from
exposure to asbestos or asbestos-containing products, or from products containing
lead chemicals, manufactured or distributed by the debtor prior to the bankruptcy pe-
tition date").
49 See supra notes 6-16 and accompanying text (suggesting that sub-classes are nec-
essary for a class involving all mass tort victims to be certified).
" See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 634, 655-56 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999)
(rejecting argument that more valuable, multi-rupture breast implant claims are not
substantially similar to single rupture claims and thus must be separately classified); id.
at 658 ("[A]Il breast-implant claims, both domestic and foreign, are substantially simi-
lar.").
51 FED. R. CiV. P. 23(a) (3).
52 FED. .IQ. P. 23(a) (4).
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members of the class [must] predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members."3 The Bankruptcy Code, by contrast, only
requires substantial similarity. Stating the differences in the re-
quirements, however, merely begs the question why typicality, ade-
quacy of representation, and predominance are concerns of class ac-
tions and not also of bankruptcy.ss
The Supreme Court's opinions in Amchem and Ortiz, while not
models of clarity, do provide some insights into the basis for the
Court's concerns about proper classification of mass tort claimants in-
volved in class action settlements. In both cases, the Court's holding
that the certification and approval of the class action settlement was
invalid rested squarely on the Court's interpretation of Rule 23.m To
the extent that the decisions interpret Rule 23, they do not apply to
questions about the proper classification of tort claimants in bank-
ruptcy reorganization plans under the Bankruptcy Code.
Going beyond the actual holdings of Amchem and 7tiz, however,
one sees suggestions of broader due process and fairness concerns
animating the Court's reasoning. For example, in Amchem, Justice
Ginsburg explained on several occasions that the certification re-
quirements of Rule 23 (a) and (b) are designed to focus the certifying
court's attention on whether the proposed class is "sufficiently cohe-
sive" to permit representational litigation, thus allowing a departure
from the usual rule that only parties to a lawsuit may be bound by its
judgment.57 In other words, because class actions constitute an excep-
BfED. R. Crv. P. 23(b) (3).
See 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1994) (providing that "a plan may place a claim or an
interest in a particular class only if such claim is substantially similar to the other claims
or interests of such class" (emphasis added)).
"' See Edith H. Jones, Rough Justice in Mass Future Claims: Should Bankruptcy Courts
Direct Tort Reform?, 76 MEx. L. REV. 1695, 1713 (1998) ("[Olne must ask what unique
bankruptcy standards warrant replacing the essential Rule 23 'class-qualifying criteria'
of commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation." (quoting Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997))).
See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2322 (1999) ("The
nub of our position is that we are bound to follow Rule 23 as we understood it upon its
adoption, and that we are not free to alter it except through the process prescribed by
Congress in the Rules Enabling Act."); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 628 ("[We have concluded
that the class in this case cannot satisfy [Rule 23's] requirements of common issue
predominance and adequacy of representation....").
57 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623 ("The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests
whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by represen-
tation."); see also id. at 621 ("Subdivisions (a) and (b) focus court attention on whether
a proposed class has sufficient unity so that absent members can fairly be bound by
decisions of class representatives."); id. at 626 n.20 (noting the overlap of the adequacy
of representation, commonality, and typicality requirements and explaining that they
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tion to the general due process requirement that everyone be af-
forded her own day in court, the rule makers imposed requirements,
which the Court applies strictly, designed to confine the certification
of classes to those situations in which there is a sufficient identity of
interest between class members and their representatives that the class
members' rights may be fairly adjudicated in their absence.s Sini-
larly, Ortiz reflects the Court's underlying concern about the due pro-
cess implications of imposing a binding resolution of claims on absent
parties without strict insistence on the absence of conflicts of interest
between class members and those purporting to represent them.
Amchem and Ortiz thus suggest that the Constitution, not just the
current version of Rule 23, prohibits the certification of broadly de-
fined settlement classes of tort claimants with varying and potentially
conflicting interests. If so, the reasoning of these decisions would also
seem to apply to classifications in bankruptcy. The Court in Ortiz,
however, distinguished bankruptcy from the class action context then
before it. After discussing the general rule that persons not joined as
parties may not be bound by the results of a lawsuit, the Court cited
(in addition to representational litigation) bankruptcy as an example
of an exceptional situation involving a "'special remedial scheme'"
that permissibly "'foreclos[es] successive litigation by nonlitigants."'"
Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court referred to the "protections for
all "'serve as guideposts for determining whether... maintenance of a class action is
economical and whether the named plaintiff's claim and the class claims are so interre-
lated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in
their absence'" (quoting General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157-58
n.13 (1982))).
-" See Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 805
(1997) (discussing the various ways in which class actions represent "a clear departure
from the premise that no one should be bound to ajudgment in personam absent the
personal security offered by notice and a full opportunity to participate in the underly-
ing litigation").
59 See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2315 (discussing the "inherent tension between represen-
tative suits and the day-in-court ideal" and noting that the tension is increased in a
mandatory class settlement because "[t] he legal rights of absent class members... are
resolved regardless either of their consent, or, in a class with objectors, their express
wish to the contrary"); see also Issacharoff, supra note 58, at 822 (discussing concerns
about mandatory class settlements in which "there is no capacity to refuse court-
appointed representation" and "the individual class member is presented with what
purports to be a bindingfait accompli4 with the only recourse a likely futile objection at
the fairness hearing required by Rule 23(e)").
SOrtiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2315 (quoting Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2, in which
the Court noted that bankruptcy and probate are examples of "legal proceedings
[that] may terminate pre-existing rights [of nonlitigants] if the scheme is otherwise
consistent with due process").
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creditors built into the Bankruptcy Code."61 These protections are in
apparent contrast to the lack of "'structural assurance of fair and ade-
quate representation for the diverse groups and individuals affected,'"
which the Court found fatal to the settlement classes presented by
both Ortiz and Amchem 6 2 Thus, the Court's view may be that bank-
ruptcy differs from class actions in significant respects that render in-
applicable the strict classification requirements that due process may
otherwise require for class action certification.6s
If bankruptcy is distinguishable, it must be because of the proce-
dural and substantive protections it affords creditors-protections that
are unavailable to absent class members when a class action is certi-
fied. In mass tort class actions, the Court's expressed concern is that
the personal injury claims of class members are being compromised
without their direct consent by persons designated to represent
them.6 The only protection for class members, other than the oppor-
tunity in some cases to opt outO and the requirement that the court
approve the settlement,6 is the insistence that the representatives
share and competently represent their interests. While bankruptcy
61
[I]t is worth noting that if limited fund certification is allowed in a situation
where a company provides only a de minimis contribution to the ultimate set-
tlement fund, the incentives such a resolution would provide to companies
facing tort liability to engineer settlements similar to the one negotiated in
this case would, in all likelihood, significantly undermine the protections for
creditors built into the Bankruptcy Code.
Id. at 2321 n.34.
62 Id, at 2319 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627).
It should be noted, however, that although the Court in Amdhem distinguished
limited fund class actions from the opt-out class action then before it, see 521 U.S. at
623 n.19, it later imposed similarly strict certification requirements on that type of class
action, see Oft/z, 119 S. Ct. at 2319-21.
" See id. at 2314-15 (discussing due process concerns with respect to mandatory
class action settlements); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626-27 (discussing need for protection of
absent class members' interests by means of representation for homogeneous sub-
groups).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (2)-(3) (providing for an opt-out right in the case of a
Rule 23(b) (3) class action).
66 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) ("A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court... .").
67 See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626 n.20, which states:
The adequacy-of-representation requirement "tend[s] to merge" with the
commonality and typicality criteria of Rule 23(a), which "serve as guideposts
for determining.., whether the named plaintiff's claim and the class claims
are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and
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also permits some creditors to represent the interests of others,6s these
representatives, by contrast, do not have the final say. An appointed
creditors' committee is primarily a negotiating agent.0 Once a reor-
ganization plan is devised, even one supported by the committee, it
must be sent out for voting by the creditors and interest holders. 70
Thus, each identifiable creditor whose claim is impaired is given the
opportunity to express his or her approval or disapproval of the pro-
posed resolution. 7' Although the Bankruptcy Code does not require
unanimity,n it guarantees dissenting creditors in an accepting class a
minimum level of paymentO3 Furthermore, if the preference of a class
adequately protected in their absence." The adequacy heading also factors in
competency and conflicts of class counsel.
Id. (quoting General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157-58 n.13) (cita-
tion omitted). Moore's Federal Practice observes that:
This "adequacy of representation" requirement was designed to protect the
due process rights of absent class members.... Because the judgment in a
class action has resjudicata implications ... for the absent class members, due
process requires that the interests of absent members be adequately repre-
sented by the class members who are parties to the action.
5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.25[1] (3d ed. 1996)
(footnotes omitted).
See 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1994) (requiring that a United States trustee appoint an
unsecured creditors' committee except in small business bankruptcy cases).
69 See, e.g., DAvID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTcy § 10-11 (1993) ("The principal
role of the committee is to speak and negotiate for the larger group which it repre-
sents."); TABB, supra note 20, at 67 ("The committee plays a particularly important role
in the formulation and confirmation of a reorganization plan. The committee negoti-
ates directly with the debtor.., over the terms of a plan on behalf of the class of credi-
tors or equity holders represented."); Marjorie L. Girth, Rethinking Fairness in Bank-
ruptcy Proceedings, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 466 (1999) ("[N]egotiations with the goal of
proposing a successful reorganization plan are usually carried out between the
debtor's representatives and those representing the creditors' committee.").
70 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a) (1994) ("The holder of a claim or interest allowed under
section 502 of this title may accept or reject a plan."); id. § 1129(a) (7), (b) (mandating
that for a plan to be confirmed, either all impaired classes must accept it, or the plan
must satisfy "cram down" requirements).
71 If a class of claims or interests is not impaired under the plan, the members of
that class "are conclusively presumed to have accepted the plan," and they need not be
given an opportunity to vote. 1d. § 1126(f).
7 See id. § 1126(c) ("A class of claims has accepted a plan if such plan has been ac-
cepted by creditors.., that hold at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half
in number of the allowed claims of such class held by creditors... that have accepted
or rejected such plan.").
See id. § 1129(a) (7) (stating that each creditor must either accept the plan or
"receive or retain under the plan... property of a value, as of the effective date of the
plan, that is not less than the amount that such [creditor] would so receive or retain if
the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date"). This guarantee
of receipt in Chapter 11 of at least the amount of the liquidation dividend is known as
the "best interests of creditors" or simply the "best interests" test. See TABB, supra note
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of creditors as a whole is overridden and the plan is crammed down
on them, the Code assures them fair treatment in relation to the other
classes of creditors and interest holders.74 Thus, the Bankruptcy Code
contains a package of protections-both procedural and substantive-
for the creditors who do not participate directly in the proceedings by
serving on a creditors' committee.75
Although these built-in protections may be sufficient to satisfy due
process concerns in traditional bankruptcy cases,76 the complexities
and innovations usually found in mass tort bankruptcies may render
these protections less effective in that context. For example, a bank-
ruptcy class of tort claimants may consist of hundreds of thousands of
persons with a variety of injuries, whether manifested or merely poten-
20, at 841 ("The best interests test of § 1129(a) (7) is intended to provide a floor of
protection for dissenting members of a class.").
74 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1) (1994) (stating that to be confirmed by cram-down
method, a plan must not "discriminate unfairly" and must be "fair and equitable" with
respect to each impaired class that has not accepted the plan). In the case of a class of
unsecured creditors, the fair and equitable test incorporates the absolute priority rule
pursuant to which no creditors or security interest holders junior to the class of unse-
cured creditors may receive any property under the plan if the unsecured creditors are
notpaidinfull. See id. at § 1129(b)(2)(B).
75 Because of the opportunity for direct voting in bankruptcy, the need for precise
definition of classes to eliminate all conflicts of interest is arguably lessened. Claimants
are permitted to speak for themselves, rather than having decisions made for them by
representatives. Because some claimants can be outvoted, however, the Bankruptcy
Code provides substantive protections to assure fair treatment. See id. § 1129(a) (7),
(b). The Court in Amchem held that a court's approval of a class action settlement as
fair cannot substitute for satisfaction of the class certification requirements. See
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997) (stating that Rule 23(e)'s
"prescription was designed to function as an additional requirement, not as a super-
seding direction, for the 'class action' to which Rule 23(e) refers is one qualified for
certification under Rule 23(a) and (b)"). Likewise, in bankruptcy the substantive pro-
tections of the best interests test and the absolute priority rule do not supersede the
voting and classification requirements. Both aspects, procedural and substantive, are
necessary to protect creditors' interests.
76 See In re Dow Coming Corp., 244 B.R. 634, 665 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999)
("[O]ne of Congress' primary motivations for limiting class membership to substan-
tially similar claims was... to ensure 'that the votes cast by the class will reflect the
joint interests of the class.'" (quoting In re Huckabee Auto Co., 33 B.R. 141, 148
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981))); William Blair, Classification of Unsecured Claims in Chapter 11
Reorganization, 58 AM. BANKR. LJ. 197, 228 (1984) ("The chapter 11 rehabilitation ob-
jectives assume that negotiation accomplished through democratic decision-making
will provide fair treatment if the distribution remains within the parameters of the con-
firmation requirements." (footnote omitted)). Cf Meltzer, supra note 47, at 299 ("I
contend that a lender's deficiency claim is substantially similar to trade claims, and
that, notwithstanding any potential conflicts of interest, the only appropriate interpre-
tation of the Code is to prohibit separate classification of the creditors holding those
claims.").
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tial, and with claims of varying degrees of legal strength.7 In a class
action context, these differences would require the creation of sub-
classes with independent representation." My concern is that in this
bankruptcy context, the ability of all members of the class to vote on
the plan may not sufficiently ensure that the voices of each distinct
subgroup will be adequately heard.7' A distinct minority-for exam-
ple, those tort claimants with especially serious injuries and strong
cases-might get outvoted by a large number of holders of small
claims who favor a quick pay-out of relatively small amounts with little
proof required. s Thus, the class as a whole may support a plan that
provides for quick pay-outs and puts significant disincentives in the
way of achieving more substantial payments, a result not in the inter-
ests of the larger tort claimants included in the class!' This possibility
is made all the more likely by the frequent practice in mass tort bank-
ruptcies of valuing all claims for voting purposes at one dollar in order
to avoid the necessity of individually liquidating each of the thousands
of tort claims.82 This practice mutes the voice of large tort claimants
See, e.g., In reA.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694, 697 (4th Cir. 1989) (describing class
of Dalkon Shield claimants as consisting of approximately 195,000 unliquidated per-
sonal injury claims); REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 2, app. E at 84
(describing the class of asbestos personal injury claims in the Eagle-Picher bankruptcy
as consisting of approximately 162,000 claims).
See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2319-20 (1999)
(holding that the differences between present and future claimants, and between
those possessing more valuable claims because of potential insurance coverage and
those without that possibility, require separate subclasses for each distinct group).
79 See Bruce A. Markell, Clueless on Classification: Toward RmovingArtifcial Limits on
Chapter 11 Classification, 11 BANKR. D~y. J. 1, 12-13 (1995) ("Behind the assumption
that voting is meaningful lies the notion that some common interest exists among the
members of a class. Otherwise, it makes little sense to say that anything less than a
unanimous vote could bind dissenters."); id. at 16 ("[A] plan proponent has the op-
portunity, under the right circumstances, to overwhelm objecting parties by including
them in a class filled with sympathetic creditors.").
8o Cf In re Dow Coming Corp., 244 B.R. at 665 (rejecting the argument that a dis-
crete subgroup within a class of physician claimants was disenfranchised by classifica-
tion together with a larger group of physician claimants having different interests; so
long as the claims are substantially similar, "assertions of attempted vote gerrymander-
ing are simply irrelevant").
81 See SOBOL, supra note 35, at 328 (arguing that the vote of the class of the Dalkon
Shield claimants was "lopsided" because 94% of the total voting stength would not
have filed claims outside of bankruptcy or had only minor injuries, while 6% had sub-
stantial claims); Vairo, supra note 42, at 134-36 (describing various pay-out options un-
der Robins trust, with quickestpayouts being for low value claims).
'2 See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d at 697 ("[F] or purposes of voting, each
Dalkon Shield Claim was estimated and allowed to be equal."); Kane v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 646 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[T]he Bankruptcy Court... 'allowed' [as-
bestos personal injury] claims for voting purposes in the arbitrary amount of one dol-
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in the voting process.
Once a subgroup of tort claimants is outvoted, the substantive
guarantee of the best interests test might provide little protection. In
a bankruptcy involving tort claims that have been estimated to amount
to hundreds of millions or billions of dollars-an amount frequently
far in excess of the value of the company-the court may quickly con-
clude that the tort claimants as a whole will receive more under the
reorganization plan's trust than they would in a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion.84 No comparison will be made between the amount a particular
dissenting tort claimant will receive under the plan and the liquida-
ton dividend he or she would receive in Chapter 7,8 since most tort
claims will not have been individually valued at this stage. It is possi-
ble, therefore, that the outvoted large tort claimants will not actually
receive as much as the Bankruptcy Code supposedly guarantees them.
The inclusion of future claimants within the bankruptcy further
complicates the effectiveness of bankruptcy's built-in protections for
mass tort claimants. Professor Resnick addresses some of the resulting
concerns by endorsing the Bankruptcy Review Commission's proposal
for the appointment of a legal representative for future mass tort
claimants. This recommendation would provide firmer statutory
authority for the practice that has been followed in a number of mass
tort bankruptcies.7 Providing a separate legal representative for the
lar...." (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1994))); REPORT ON MASS TORT LITGATION,
supra note 2, app. E at 30 ("When it came time to tabulate the votes, each asbestos per-
sonal injury and property damages claim, as well as each lead personal injury claim,
would be valued at $1.00.").
a3 See, eg., In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d at 699 (noting that the district court val-
ued Dalkon Shield claims at $2.475 billion); REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra
note 2, app. E at 30 (noting that the bankruptcy court estimated present and future
asbestos claims at $2.5 billion; as a result of a compromise with the unsecured credi-
tors' committee, the valuation was reduced to $2 billion).
See, e.g., In reA.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d at 698-700 (indicating that the Fourth Cir-
cuit rejects a challenge to the confirmation of the Robins reorganization plan based on
the best interests test, and examining only the basis for the district court's estimation
of value of Dalkon Shield claims); In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 203 B.R. 256, 275
(S.D. Ohio 1996) (concluding, with little discussion, that given the inclusion of future
asbestos claims within the bankruptcy proceeding, the best interests test is satisfied);
SOBOL, supra note 35, at 238-43 (criticizing application of the best interests test in Rob-
ins bankruptcy).
u See, e.g., sources cited supra note 73 (explaining the best interests test).
6 See Resnick, sura note 4, Part II.B
8 See, e.g., In reA.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 744 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988),affd, 880
F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989) (listing a "Future Claimants' Representative" among the "offi-
cial committees" appointed in the case); In re UNR Indus., Inc., 46 B.R. 671, 674
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985) (authorizing appointment of a legal representative for "putative
asbestos disease victims"); REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 2, app. E at
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future claimants also addresses the concerns expressed by the Su-
preme Court in Amchem and Ortiz about the inadequacy of representa-
tion due to conflicts of interest between claimants with present inju-
ries and those whose injuries have not yet manifested.8 Experience to
date shows that future claims' representatives can provide an inde-
pendent voice for the interests of the unknown future claimants. This
independent voice counterbalances the advocacy by other creditors'
committees, including any tort claimants' committee that is appointed
and that might be presumed primarily to represent the interests of
present claimants. 9
Although the conflict of interest problem can be reduced by the
participation of a future claims' representative, other concerns re-
main. Most future claimants are unable to participate directly in the
bankruptcy case because their identities will not be known until some
future, post-bankruptcy date. Thus, even if the rights of present tort
claimants are adequately protected by their opportunity to vote to ac-
cept or reject the reorganization plan and by the provision of substan-
tive protections for them if they are outvoted, future claimants' rights
are exclusively in the hands of their representative. That representa-
tive will not only negotiate on the future claimants' behalf, but she will
also vote on the plan for them and will raise any objections to confir-
mation on their behalf.9 In this instance bankruptcy becomes a rep-
resentational suit, like a class action, rather than a special remedial
scheme with its own built-in protections. Any statutory authorization
for the appointment of a future claims' representative therefore needs
to take account of the due process and fairness concerns raised with
respect to binding absent parties to the results of representational
39 (discussing appointment of a "legal representative for future personal injury and
property damage claimants" in asbestos bankruptcy).
See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2319-20 (1999) ("[I]t
is obvious after Amchem that a class divided between holders of present and future
claims (some of the latter involving no physical injury and to claimants not yet born)
requires subdivision into homogeneous subclasses .... with separate representation to
eliminate conflicting interests of counsel."); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 626 (1997) ("[Flor the currently injured, the critical goal is generous immediate
payments. That goal tugs against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an
ample, inflation-protected fund for the future.").
"9 See, e.g., REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 2, app. E at 39-40 (dis-
cussing independent role played by future claims' representative in asbestos bank-
ruptcy); SOBOL, supra note 35, at 222-23 (discussing future claims' representative's op-
position to reorganization plans that did not adequately protect the rights of future
Dalkon Shield claimants).
'o See, e.g., NATIONAL BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANxRUpTCy: THE NEXT TWENTY
YEARS 32930 (1997) (recommending the appointment of a mass future claims repre-
sentative).
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suits,9' even if bankruptcy generally is freed of those requirements.
While the Bankruptcy Review Commission wisely suggests that some
mass tort bankruptcies may require the appointment of multiple fa-
ture claims' representatives,92 the experience to date has been that
only one person is appointed to represent all future tort claimants in
the case. a Amchem and Ortiz cast doubt on the legitimacy of such a
monolithic representation of future claimants.
Professor Resnick and other commentators have argued that the
appointment of a future claims' representative, coupled with the pro-
vision of constructive notice, will satisfy any procedural due process
concerns about the inclusion of future claimants in a mass tort bank-
ruptcy.9 Professor Resnick himself notes, however, that the Supreme
Court in Amchem raised questions about the efficacy of notice to per-
sons who "may not even know of their exposure, or realize the extent
of the harm they may incur."95 Although the Court found no need to
rule definitively on this point, it did pointedly question whether "no-
tice sufficient under the Constitution ... could ever be given to le-
gions so unselfconscious and amorphous.9 5  Given that statement,
one might question whether the Supreme Court will view constructive
notice as providing much protection for future claimants in bank-
ruptcy.97 If not, the Court may be unwilling to allow future claimants
9' SeeJones, supra note 55, at 1722 ("[A] collective remedy is a collective remedy,
whether enforced in a class action or bankruptcy, and the criteria necessary to protect
absentee class members' rights should not in principle vary depending on the fo-
rum.").
92 SeeNATIONAL BANKiR REVIEW COMM'N, sura note 90, at 332 ("Each class of mass
future claimholders would be entitled to its own representative, as the interests of the
classes of mass future claims may be adverse to one another.").
93 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 87 (listing cases in which a single individual was
appointed to represent the interests of future tort claimants).
See Resnick, supra note 4, Part II.B (noting how appointment of a future claim-
ants' representative and constructive notice meets any due process concerns); see also
Kathryn R. Heidt, Future Claims in Bankruptcy: The NBC Amendments Do Not Go Far
Enough, 69 AM. BANIR. L.J. 515, 515 (1995) ("Any due process problems resulting from
insufficient notice or knowledge can be addressed by appointing a representative for
the future claimants and establishing a fund to pay the claimants as their claims be-
come fixed."); Ralph R. Mabey & Jamie Andra Gavrin, Constitutional Limitations on the
Discharge of Future Claims in Bankruptcy, 44 S.C. L. REV. 745, 781 (1993)
("The... mandate of Mullane therefore usually requires the opportunity for future
claimants to be heard through a representative when publication notice to them is
largely futile.").
95 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997).
96 Id.
9 An argument can be made that in many bankruptcy cases, effective notice can be
given to persons who are in the population of those expected to incur claims against
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to be bound by a reorganization plan confirmed in a bankruptcy case
in which their interests were litigated by an appointed representative
unless great care was given to ensuring the absence of conflicting in-
terests within the group represented by each future claims' represen-
tative.
CONCLUSION
Professor Resnick has stated well the advantages of utilizing bank-
ruptcy as a vehicle for resolving mass torts. Bankruptcy has many pro-
cedural and conceptual features that can be applied to permit a reso-
lution of all of the claims facing a beleaguered mass tort defendant.
My enthusiasm for a bankruptcy solution, however, is tempered by the
recognition of the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in other
mass tort contexts about forcing a judicial resolution on claimants
who are not active participants in the lawsuit leading to the global so-
lution. Perhaps bankruptcy is sufficiently distinguishable from class
actions that the Supreme Court will eventually approve it as a mass
tort device. As other options disappear or become less attractive, it
may become one of the few remaining possibilities. To date, however,
the Court has not shown itself to be pragmatic in its approach to the
judicial resolution of mass torts. 8 As a result, although a bankruptcy
the debtor in the future. In the asbestos bankruptcies, for example, extensive efforts
have been made to provide notice by means of publications directed at unions and or-
ganizations of workers in industries that involved exposure to asbestos, as well as notice
to attorneys handling such cases and widespread notice in general circulation publica-
tions. See, e.g., REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 2, app. E at 42 (describ-
ing extensive notice of bar date given in Eagle-Picher bankruptcy).
Although such announcements may be ignored by many who presently suffer no
illness, perhaps it is reasonable to expect that enough persons who know that they
have been exposed to asbestos will see the notices that the actions of the future claims'
representative can thereby be effectively monitored. Moreover, when these future
claimants' injuries do manifest themselves, they will still have the opportunity to liqui-
date their claims pursuant to the trust or administrative mechanism that is established
under the reorganization plan. Even if the "practicalities and peculiarities" of a mass
tort bankruptcy case, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950), justify the provision of constructive notice to such future claimants, I fear that
it pushes the limits of due process too far to include within the group of future claim-
ants persons who, at the time of bankruptcy, have not been exposed to the offending
product. It cannot even be pretended that someone who has not yet purchased, used,
or come in contact with a product that precipitates a mass tort bankruptcy will have
any reason to understand that the bankruptcy might affect her rights.
See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2325 (1999) (Breyer,
J., dissenting):
I cannot easily find a legal answer to the problems this case raises by referring,
as does the majority, to "our deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone
should have his own day in court." Instead, in these circumstances, I believe
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believer, I remain chary about predicting the ultimate triumph of
bankruptcy as a mass tort vehicle.
our Court should allow a district court full authority to exercise every bit of
discretionary power that the law provides.
Id. (citation and internal quotation omitted); see also Awhe ,z 521 U.S. at 629 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) ("I believe that the need for settlement in this mass tort case, with hun-
dreds of thousands of lawsuits, is greater than the Court's opinion suggests.").
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